

Dec. 21, 1995

What have I been afraid to face —
to tell?

1)

The Accident.

2)

— My role in 1964-65: the escalation.

3)

— In particular: the night of Quan Nam.

The night I helped McNamara
COV to launch a continuous bombing campaign —
which I believed, correctly, would not
improve the terms on which we could end
the war, i.e. improve the conditions under
which we would live after the war,
and would not improve our image or
influence in ending the war — in the century
we could be seen correctly as committing
war crimes, as behaving badly, and to no
end — I thought that, contrary to McN,
it would be my best to stop the bombing,
to "give up" that "chip" (He — torturing/killing
as a bargaining "chip")

Nevertheless, I did my best to give McN
what he could use to persuade COV: vivid
details of abuse & mutilation of Americans,
sentinel wounds, dragged bodies ... so that
also [look up his account in new book] would
show mutilation. Atrocities — vs. Americans
Look where — why did they attack Americans?
With what expectations, if they did or didn't?
What were the "options," the goals/values/
considerations, the uncertainties/"probabilities":
the "decision problem."

Then, I organized the regular reporting.
Fishnet, pornography for the bureaucrats, to justify
what we were doing [see Gulf War behavior + incubators]

What else? I was proud of my revision of war plans, they seemed so much less ghastly than the ones I replaced, and they encouraged greater DPs involvement and last-minute choice: hence, a retreat to PALs (failed, in May: see Cruise Pile, Blair - is this changing, or not?)

and DPs' reaching of plans, with change of civilian sensitivity.

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But: What if my plans were "the last word"?

What if they were seen as a first cut, the original strategy? How moral would they be? How safe?

How "low" would be the collateral damage?

How great, the overall damage? [DID I EVER ASK THAT?]

e.g. under various options: but especially, the "M-I Mix," Killy's favorite ("first priority")

And see how they evolved, according to HAK & others, as more weapons became available!

(GET the study done on strategy and race!

Has been (mostly?) discussed, & was told (by...?)

Blair...

See the use made of my paper under Bryan (!) - Ken Stoss (talk to.

and Hent? Bob Lukman?]

So - as I acknowledged at UN, NPT Conf, April 95 - I kidded myself on how much more moral my plans were.

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My rank moments:

- guaranteed ritual, at RAND.
- One Nhon
- Cuba II: - "We'll shoot down this missiles!"
(to Katynowich)

- My anguish - crying in relief, after -
at Tanya JFK would give away Turkish
missiles. My inability to draft message,
earlier.

1956: fight family, UK, F
our day!

- My confidence K would back down.
Hence, my proposed Tanya list, insertion.
- 1958-59: my obsession with missile gap,
SU nuclear attack, at Rockefeller,
[AW's & Robert's Trot perspective?]

- EGI Jean: drop captured weapons in
NVN countryside - "return to..."

- My proposed JFK-K talk, in Berlin,
& Kagan, after SV/E. ("consider characteristics of the
channel")

- My Killebrew speech! (a FC threat!
(It was not accompanied by NFO assurance)

- My Ann Arbor speech (though I disagreed
with giving it, not with FS flavor).

- Supporters: grand troops in VN, after RT!

- My speech drafts for mobilization, Feb 65
V.A. RT (TG?)

BUT: NFS

For most sol. doesn't intend
cover...

NO delegation, for action

NFO (though persuaded by Hong to cool it in '61)

Anti-prolif (French, declining)

anti-S/OP, citing

Adapted on CF - not CD - not ABM

Conti-MIRV - when did I become aware? MX, SS-18 already -

My guilt.

1. - Silence to Congress,
media,
public
world
on S/O P, Delegation, Prohib, dangers
in 1960 (hinted to Demos. Posters, Ritz)
and 1961, 1962, 1963

About Cuba II, after 1962

(and other war crises — to which,
indeed, I wanted access — esp. from C-IB on
(my first impulse in 1961 was to influence Berlin
crisis — see impact on me of Berlin gaming
(Abt Chayns)

In 1964, I was supporting Pres vs. a real
USAF Admiralty: one area in VN

ADD to

file: \pp\McNAMOYARA.JCS

AGE 21, 1996 (today!)

we were "felling hush, discreet"

debate area: (support of Financing..)

Pres was backing Fourth Squad (Yarns)

Kelly was backing Goldwater secret (Karl Hess):

VS. THE PRINCIPLE THAT MIL. COULDN'T

SPEAK OUT ABOUT DECEPTION OF PUBLIC —

COULDN'T TELL SECRETS. (But details from Hess)

If didn't tell on CBS in '64 because they
expected him to move in "right direction" after
election — & Goldwater couldn't really get elected
if being open about the profound policy —
so the approach of deception in '64...

It was in '65 they wanted a different strategy
from the one CBS chose — being bigger, broader,
faster; mobilization [tense invasion of NVN, for
what? Was that always his strategy? being more
& invasion? (more?)

If could have exposed him on these points — but then they might have learned chances of getting them later from USV. He might have attacked this position, to protect Hunt's safety. And without Pres leadership, this strategy might have been rejected by public.

So again, the accepted/approval of/participated in disruption

[JUST AS TAYLOR/MCN DID in 1961, on contract units.]

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But A — why didn't I tell in 1964? Any-bt.
"Too soon — I just got here." (I had info.)

— Then, in October - November⁶⁴, fatal planning, massive disruption of public

[as in fall 1968! — in 8 circles! I was fooled!]

[as now, in Bosnia?!]

— Then — and in spring — summer '65 — is when I participated in a massive and disastrous war conspiracy, after stealing a landslide,

(Does McN really cap to this? NO, not at all — not even to TG! or make his own role clear? after all, even if he was "working for what the Pres wanted," he played a major role, to say the least! How did others' act?

But what about McG + WPB? They haven't talked yet, even as much as McN. Do they find this bizarre to live and to conceal & deceive even girls, even officers

first to RFK

I did start leaking in Feb '68 (after 206,000):
Whelan, 206,000, given-and info, and OB...

Secret

What difference between Feb '68 and Oct '69?
Scale.

Documents.

Assurance of going to prison ^{for life} — as opposed to
losing clearance, access, (I did, with
Bermuda: example,
job.
≈ RAND letter

Denial, significance of Kellin, fossils, WRL (I did
after 1968 books.)

Thus, ⁴ these levels of risk-taking, revelation, commitment

1. With gov

(assure of job — by passing, closing
circuits, alerting, warning, educating
CST; JSCP; Delegation; WSEG; ^{under} VN "recon", roads,
Crisis Studies

risks: RAND Panel Council; Adolph Burke & Kellin;

(Could control risks, with skill, civility & loyalty
like bull-fighter...

2. To public: Bermuda '67

RAND letter '69

Loss some but not all access

Kellin & Congressmen

briefings & columnists

3. To PFK, the NYT, class. does in 1968

risk clearance and job

(see H&K in 1968, to N, to Thien, many, co. "October
Surprise":
1968, 1972...

DID GOLDWATER (NOT) WORRY ABOUT AN "OCTOBER
SURPRISE" in 1964?!

(see Admining letter N & VFK in 1960, on
Bay of Pigs!)

Secret

4. PP: * Fullbright
Mortimer

IPS

Goodell? McNamee? Mathias? McClellan?
Nelson?

NYT

Wash Post

oth. press

Grant

5. Nuc War Plans; NSSM-1 ...

on (3), what made us willing to risk destruction
and jobs? IN. 1968

1968

- Fear of escalation at Khe Sanh;
and invasion of RVN. (justified!)

"

- Example of effectiveness of 206,000 base.

"

- Expectation that CB would imitate pattern of
1964 on — grant 100,000 (or 200,000) but
announced 40,000;

I wanted to forecast that — force
toward escalation, at this turning point.

Make you look "transparent."

(that statement was;

ask Clifford, Wavens